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A B S T R A C T
Iran is currently discussing cannabis and opium regulations, which could bring a legalisation of drug consumption
through a state supervised system. The article engages with the question of cannabis by looking at the legal interpretation
of religious authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The choice of Iran is justified for several reasons: firstly, Iran has a
long history of drug use and cannabis has been part of the country’s intoxicant traditions since times immemorial;
secondly, the Iranian state is unique in that it combines religious exegesis with political machination through official
channels; finally, among all Middle East and Islamic countries, Iran is at the avant-garde in experimenting in the field of
drugs policy which makes an excellent case for the study of cannabis regulation. The article is the result of a direct
engagement with Iran’s leading Shi’a authorities, the maraje’-e taqlid, ‘source of emulation’. The authors redacted a list of
eight questions (estefta’at) about the status of cannabis in Iranian society. It questioned cannabis’ legality in Islam, its
potential medical use, the feasibility of domestic production and other relevant aspects of its social-religious life. Based on
the responses, the authors analysed the difference in opinions among the religious scholars and speculate on the possi-
bility of policy reform. Given the dearth of scholarly work about illicit drugs in the Islamic world, about which many
readers might not be familiar, the article opens with an overview of the place of cannabis in the history of Islamic
societies. It discusses terminological ambiguities, references in religious texts and traditions, and the general interpreta-
tions within Muslim religious schools of thought. Then, it discusses the status of cannabis in contemporary Iran before
tackling the responses provided by the religious scholars. Eventually, the paper puts forward reflections about the po-
tential implications for future policy developments on cannabis.
Introduction
Middle Eastern states and the Islamic world are known for adopting strict
codes of prohibitions. These apply to sexual norms, such as premarital sex,
social practices such as gambling and consumption behaviour as in the case
of alcohol and narcotic drugs. Narcotic drugs however are hardly exceptional
to Islamic societies and/or the Middle East. Across the globe, prohibition of
narcotic substances has been a common trait of the 19th and 20th centuries
(Courtwright, 2009; Campos, 2012; Carrier & Klantschnig, 2012; Mills, 2003;
Robins, 2013; Safian, 2013). Countries as different as the United States,
Britain, China, the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation) as well as
almost every Third World, Global South state have adopted forms of reg-
ulation and prohibition of narcotics (Chouvy & Meissonnier, 2004; Chouvy,
2009; Windle, 2016). Yet, change is under way in this sphere. Since the
2000s, several countries in the Western hemisphere have taken steps towards
changing the regime of prohibition of formerly illicit drugs. In particular,
cannabis has been the object of these undertakings. Portugal, Uruguay and a
number of US states have adopted policies that regulate the use of cannabis
among the population (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011; Pardo, 2014).
Other states are in the process of evaluating and updating their model of
cannabis regulation, such as Spain, Italy and, surprisingly, the Islamic Re-
public of Iran.
The debate around cannabis’ status today is regarded as a turf of Western
policy and scientific circles. The Global South and, particularly, the Middle
East, where once the drug had its roots and tales of inebriation, is regarded as
static. The Middle East is seen as a status quo region with regard to drug
policy reform (Robins, 2013). Yet, Islamic societies have had long and ani-
mated histories of debate around themerits and evils of cannabis. Persian and
Arab scientists, religious scholars, poets and historians have evaluated the
place of cannabis in their respective social milieu (Afsahi & Darwich, 2016;
Nahas, 1982). They preceded by many centuries the drugs policy circles that
are active in the 2000s. From this perspective, the potential of debate and
change around the status of cannabis in the Middle East and Islamic World is
high, even when compared with the social conservatorism of many Arab
countries.
Hence, the article engages with the question of cannabis by looking at the
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legal interpretation of religious authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
choice of Iran is justified for several reasons: firstly, Iran has a long history of
drug use and cannabis has been part of the country’s intoxicant mores since
times immemorial; secondly, the Iranian state is unique in that it combines
religious exegesis with political machination through official channels; fi-
nally, among all Middle East and Islamic countries, Iran is at the avant-garde
in experimenting in the field of drugs policy (Ghiabi, 2017; Razzaghi,
Nassirimanesh, Afshar, & Ohiri, 2006), which makes an excellent case for the
study of cannabis’ legal status and prospects of reform.
The article is the result of a direct engagement with Iran’s leading Shi’a
authorities, the maraje’-e taqlid, ‘source of emulation’, who are religious
scholars legitimated with the interpretation of religious rules. The authors
redacted a list of eight questions (estefta’at) about the status of cannabis. The
questionnaire touches upon cannabis’ legality in Islam, its potential medical
use, the feasibility of domestic production and other relevant aspects of its
social-religious life. Based on the responses, the authors analyse the difference
in opinions among the religious scholars and speculate on the possibility of
policy reform. Given the dearth of scholarly work about illicit drugs in the
Islamic world, about which many readers might not be familiar, the article
opens with an overview of the place of cannabis in the history of the Middle
East with an especial focus on Iran. It discusses terminological ambiguities,
references in religious texts and traditions, and the general interpretations
within Muslim religious schools of thought. Then, it discusses the status of
cannabis in contemporary Iran before tackling the responses provided by the
religious scholars. Eventually, the article puts forward reflections about the
potential implications for future policy developments on cannabis.
Method
The article is based on a combination of archival research, literature re-
view and questionnaires and interviews on the subject of cannabis’ legal and
religious standing in Iran. For the historical part, we made use of the National
Archive in Tehran and on collections of published material in Persian. We
also carried out an overview of the published material in English and French
and integrated that with our own archival collection. Following that, we
surveyed the legal regulations with regard to cannabis in modern Iran and
paid attention to the developments under the foundation of the Islamic
Republic in 1979. This included an engagement with the policy debates over
the last five years, which touched upon possible cannabis law reform. Finally
come the most original side of the project which is the engagement with
clerical authorities:
The position of clerical authorities today is unclear with regard to can-
nabis and potential medical use of it. Convinced that their position could have
an impact for current policy debates, we approached nineteen leadingmarja‘s
based in Iran (and Iraq) through a set of eight questions on cannabis. The
selection was based on the prominence of the religious figures and included
marja‘s in Iraq since the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq are home to
prominent figures which hold influence also in Iran.1 Prominence here is
defined on the basis of public acknowledgement of themarja‘s standing, a fact
that although it may sound disputable has been upheld rather uncontested
over several centuries.2 Before engaging the marja‘s the team prepared a text
on current scientific knowledge about cannabis. This synthetic text in Persian
illustrated the major lines of the debate about harms and uses of cannabis as
reported in the current scholarship. The text was annexed to the ques-
tionnaire sent to the clerical authorities who could use it in case they required
further details about the elements included in the questions. Table 1 illus-
trates the questions asked to the marja‘s indicates the names and profiles of
the scholars involved in the study, together with their responses to the
questions. Not all the marja‘s responded to the questionnaire and we avoid
speculation about this. One should add that these scholars deal with hundreds
if not thousands of questions every day; the very large mole of questions that
reach the marja‘s may impact on their response capacity. Moreover, those
marja‘s that hold important political roles in the Iranian state may have
avoided responses to the questions in order not to weight on legislative
process. This may especially hold water in the case of the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The engagement with the marja‘s occurred through the mailing (and e-
mailing) of questions (estefta‘at) to the marja”s central office. The office took
the questions in charge and provided a response, undersigned by the marja‘
(Fig. 1). The format of response is synthetic and the marja“s don”t provide
specific reasons for their opinions. This style is based on the acceptance of
their authority legitimatised on an established career as an Islamic jurist. In
the article’s last section, the reader can find a summary of the questions and
the responses and an analysis of these.
Historical background
Hum, homa, soum, sama, giyah-e javidan (‘the herb of the immortal’), giyah-
e moqaddas (‘sacred herb’), khadar (‘green’), kimiyah (‘alchemy’), qanaf
(‘hemp’), zomord-e giyah-e (‘smerald herb) are among the many expressions
given to cannabis in the Iranian plateau (Gnoli & Saʿīdī Sīrjānī, 1988; Rabeie,
1998). More popular names are hashish, the Arabic word for “grass”, bang, an
Avestan term indicating whole cannabis residue, or the Persian word for
‘grass’, ‘alaf. In contemporary times, other words have added up to these:
marijuana, sabz, jay, charas and gol. But the name that has entered the Persian
language is shahdaneh, “the royal seed”. The word is currently used to refer to
cannabis both as a plant, a seed and a drug.
Prior to the Islamic era, the plant was cultivated and used in rituals by
Zoroastrian priests. In one of the Avestan hymns contained in their sacred
book, Gat-ha, reference to the defence of the environment and care of the
‘sacred plant’ is thought of ceiling a reference to cannabis (Rabeie, 1998, p.
19). Reference to cannabis for rituals and spiritual performance is abundant
also during the Islamic era (651–…). Hashish, in particular, was known to be
a favourite substance starting from the 13th century Mongol conquests. The
Sufi sect of the Qalandars which originated in Khorasan (Eastern Iran) made
of hashish consumption (as well as wine drinking) a hallmark of their public
behaviour (Matthee, 2005, pp. 40–41). The hashish pipe, up to today, is re-
ferred to as nafir-e vahdat, ‘the trumpet of unity [with god]’ (Neligan, 1929).
Dervishes, the mendicant Sufis, have also been known for their use of bang
and hashish, for instance in the form of a yogurt and cannabis preparation
called dugh-e vahdat, ‘drink of unity’.
These are few references to the presence of cannabis in the history of the
Iranian plateau. Less plausible are the accounts borne out of Marco Polo’s
voyage which popularised the figure of Hasan-e Sabah and his volunteer
army of hashishiyun, ‘those on hashish’, in Alamut (from where many believed
the word ‘assassin’ derived) (CASTO, 1970). This tale became an Orientalist
trope that mediated the diffusion of cannabis in the Mediterranean and late
across the West, with resonance in the travel accounts of European or-
ientalists. However, cannabis was not simply a drug of religious deviance and
heterodox spirituality. It had an established place within the pharmacopeia of
Iranian civilisation. In The Canon of the Iranian scientist Avicenna re-
commended it as a useful analgesic for headaches (Gorji & Ghadiri, 2002). If
opium (taryak) did not produce relief, the Iranian doctor suggested to take
‘ambergris, aloe wood, juniper and poppy head, saffron…of each one quarter
gram complete; and of the chief ingredient of that which dreamers call “the
mysteries” [hashish] a weigh equal to all…mixed into a mass with honey.
Take of it occasionally as Sufis do’ (Neligan, 1929). The physician al-Razi
(Rhazes) indicated hemp leaves as cure for ear problems, dandruff, flatulence
as well as epilepsy (Nahas, 1982).
Therefore, in the medical practice of Muslim societies, especially in Iran,
cannabis has historically been used as analgesic, appetite inductor, euphoric
and sexual inhibitor (although prolonged use was known to diminish sexual
impulse) (Peters & Nahas, 1999). This secular knowledge about the use and
1 One has to consider that the Shi‘a clergy operates transnationally and can express
legal opinions that apply to Shi‘a believers wherever they are. In the case of Iraq-based
marja‘s they often happen to be involved culturally and politically in Iranian affairs. This
is the case of prominent cleric Ali al-Sistani, himself an Iranian residing in Iraq, see (Louër
2008). Transnational Shia politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf. Columbia
University Press.
2 There is no appointment process for marja‘s. They reach legitimacy based on the
number of their followers and on their record of publication. See (Clarke 2007).
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abuses of cannabis was equally enriched by the debate about its legal status
among Muslim religious scholars. This medicalised debate on cannabis cer-
tainly benefited from the lack of explicit prohibition in the Islamic primary
sources. While the prohibition of wine is an agreed matter based on the ex-
plicit Koranic forbiddance, references to hashish, cannabis and other hemp
derivatives are absent from the sacred text. This void opens up the possibility
of interpretation among legal scholars with results that are not always
unanimous, as this article discusses.
Scholars have struggled to find early accounts on cannabis and hashish at
the time of the Prophet Muhammad (571–632). There are several accounts
(hadith) among theologians, but none of them is considered accountable or
having a strong transmission line (silsilah). One reports the Prophet saying,
‘There will come a day when people will consume a substance called banj
[bang]. I avoid them and they avoid me’ (Tabarsi, 1988). Another tells: ‘Salute
on the Jews and the Nasiri [Christians], but do not salute on the bang
smokers’ (al-Hindi, 1979; Tabarsi, 1988). Both accounts seem to surface at a
time when bang and hashish have gained popularity in the Middle East,
especially in Iran. They may be expression of heightened tensions towards
public intoxication of cannabis around both 16th century and 19th century
when these substances were unsystematically praised and punished (Matthee,
2005). Contemporary scholars rarely base their judgement on these sources;
instead, they privilege hermeneutical approaches that can be indirectly re-
lated to cannabis consumption.
The lack of Koranic reference stimulated the mind of religious scholars in
interpreting the status of cannabis. Given the void in the hermeneutical
sources, scholars judged the validity (halal) or prohibition (haram) of can-
nabis use based analogy (qiyas). Wine (al-khamr) is the comparative element
taken into account, but most scholars disagree on equating wine with can-
nabis. A widely accepted account (hadith-e hil) says, ‘Everything is allowed for
you [halal lak] until you learn it is forbidden…’. Hence, cannabis does not
carry a total prohibition among most Muslim scholars (Safian, 2013). Al-
lameh Helli (1250–1325), a leading scholar, said, ‘for the poison that derives
from the herbs [hashish-ha] and the plants, if it has benefits [manfe’at], its sale
and trade is not an issue. If it does not have benefits, then it is not permitted’
(Rezapourshokuhi, 2002). In another source, the scholar asked from one of
his students whether hashish is intoxicant and harmful and if it is forbidden,
Helli responds, ‘What is known among the people is that hashish is intoxicant,
so eating it is prohibited not because it is harmful to the body but because
intoxicates...Despite the prohibition of hashish, it is not impure [najes] be-
cause impurity is specific to alcoholic spirits [musakkerat]’ (Rezapourshokuhi,
2002). Shahid al-Awwal, another prominent Shia scholar from Damascus,
states that almost all scholars who have preceded his era or his con-
temporaries agreed ‘that plants known as hashish have been judged as pro-
hibited’ (Rezapourshokuhi, 2002). Nonetheless social and medical remained
unhindered by legal constriction, except for sporadic instances due to the
rulers’ changing ideas about hashish (Matthee, 2005).
One interpretative category that may be particularly relevant in relation
to cannabis use for medical reasons is that of ‘emergency’ (zarurat). Scholars
may allow believers to use or to perform generally prohibited substances or
acts if these are deemed necessary in situations of emergency, or absolute
necessity (Schirazi, 1998). For instance, if a believer founds himself with great
thirst in the desert and the only available drink is wine− a forbidden drink
for Muslims – then he/she is allowed (indeed he/she is obliged) to drink wine
in order to save his/her life. So, if cannabis is useful for the health of a person,
especially under serious risk, it can be used even when considered prohibited.
This approach is legitimated based on a Koranic verse (al-kul maytah) and an
accepted tradition (hadith-e raf‘) which reiterate that forbidden acts are al-
lowed in times of emergency, if they can be useful and save lives (Ghiabi, in
press). The primacy of life over religious prohibition is thus generally sanc-
tioned. In practice, however, the use of “emergency” in interpreting the law
facilitates the approval of otherwise unacceptable behaviours. In light of these
elements, the debate around cannabis in contemporary times has gone
through a great dynamism, including with proposals of reform of the current
prohibitionist regime.
From cannabis prohibition to cannabis regulation in Iran
It is with the establishment of the modern state (1920s) and, especially,
with the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 that prohibition of drugs,
including cannabis, become more stringent. In the first part of the 20th
century, cannabis was a primary concern to Iranian policymakers (and re-
ligious scholars). Public anxiety has generally been manifested towards other
mind-altering substances, such as alcoholic drinks and opium. The latter, in
particular, was the object of a first state-led monopoly during the 1920s and a
total prohibition later in 1955 (Ghiabi, 2018a). Popularly accepted within
Iranians’ mores and an integrated part of the traditional pharmacopeia,
opium was re-interpreted during the modernisation process as a backward
habit and a highly addictive substance. This prohibitionist impetus coincided
with the international effort, sponsored by the United States, to control (and
later eradicate) opium culture (Musto, 1999). This new vision was eagerly
espoused by Iranian lawmakers with the hope of demonstrating their con-
formism with Western modernity (Ghiabi, 2017). Cannabis was not included
in Iran’s first drug laws and its control remained mostly a question of moral
condemnation led by public intellectuals and religious zealots. Among social
groups seen as principle consumers were university graduates returning from
studies abroad and the dervishes who begged and smoked hashish with little
care about mainstream morality (Gnoli & Saʿīdī Sīrjānī, 1988). In fact, the
first Penal Law of the Pahlavi era, approved on January 27, 1926, referred
exclusively to the crime ‘of opium, charas and bang public intoxication [mo-
tejaher]’ (Penal Law, 1926). The punishment were severe when one considers
that previously there stood no fine: from eight days to three months in-
carceration or the payment of two to fifty tuman.
Despite pressures from the international drug control machinery,
which had adopted measures to supervise and control cannabis, the
Iranian government ignored the matter (Bouquet, 1950). Only on June
22, 1959, Iran’s Senate approved the first law that made cannabis il-
legal. Without any specific discussion of the matter, the law established
that the provisions that apply to opium, following the 1955 opium ban,
Table 1
Questions sent to the Marja's.
Questions
1. Is the consumption of cannabis and its derivatives permitted?
2. If cannabis and its derivatives are consumed for treatment of diseases, what is the
judgement?
3. Is the cultivation of cannabis for the purpose of production of legal medical and
pharmacological products permitted?
4. Is cultivation and production of cannabis for export permitted?
5. Some people believe that hashish is najes (impure). Is hashish impure? If yes, why?
6. If cannabis and its derivatives (e.g. hashish, marijuana, etc.) are used for medical
consumption, what should the Muslim do in the month of Ramadan? Can he use it
while he is fasting?
7. If the person has used cannabis and its derivatives (hashish, marijuana, etc.) is his prayer
valid?
8. Are artistic products, such as films, songs, etc., which show cannabis use, permitted?
Fig. 1. Ayatolllah Makarem Shirazi's response.
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should now apply to cannabis too. This ban laid the ground for Iran’s
signature of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs.
It was with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 that the
Iranian state adopted a staunch and uncompromising approach vis à vis all
mind-altering drugs, including cannabis. This move made the Islamic
Republic to adopt among the most powerful measures to control and repress
drug trafficking and use, under the banner of Islam rather than that of the
international drug control regime (Ghiabi, 2015). The first drug laws were
approved by the Council for the Expediency of State (Majma‘-e Tashkhis-e
Maslahat-e Nezam) in 1988 at a time of great political quakes. With regard to
cannabis, the law established that “the cultivation of cannabis [shahdaneh] for
the purpose of narcotic production” is illegal. The penalties for cannabis were
equal to those envisioned for opium production and they contemplated, in
extremis, the death penalty (Anti-Narcotic Law, 1988).
While the Iranian authorities successfully eradicated poppy cultivation
during the 1980s, the cannabis plant was harder to get rid of. Spontaneous
flowering of cannabis is not a rare sight across the Iranian plateau and given
that the government’s priority remained to curtail the flow of opiates − in
consideration of the heavy toll of opium and heroin use – cannabis use re-
mained partly an issue on the background. By the 2000s, in line with global
consumption modes, larger numbers of Iranians had acquired a renewed taste
for cannabis and its derivatives. The traditional hashish smokers, popularly
known as the bangis, have in part been replaced by urban marijuana smokers,
who belonged to the modern wealthier end of the social spectrum. This shift
has signified also that cannabis is now obtained not only through illegal drug
networks which travelled westward from Afghanistan, the country disposing
of the highest quality of hashish, but also domestically. At times, cultivation of
cannabis would occur in the balcony and terraces of urban centres, the Iranian
climate being ideal for such agricultural endeavours (Fararu, July 27, 2014).
Cannabis use surfaced in the public eye when the head of the Drug
Control Headquarters, Iran’s umbrella organisation for illicit drugs, affirmed
that a new drug, gol (‘flower’) had become the second most common con-
sumed drugs after opium (ADNA, July 3, 2017). Gol indicates the flowers of
cannabis plant, which contain a higher level of THC and therefore produce
stronger psychoactive effects. This was similar to the trend inWestern capitals
where cannabis potency has progressively gone up in part due to the gov-
ernmental clampdown and in part in response to users’ preference (EMCDDA,
2017). In response to this development, Iranian drugs policymakers have been
discussing possible reforms that would update the old-fashioned prohibitionist
regime. One important case is given by the proposal to regulate through state
monopolies the cultivation of the poppy and cannabis plant. This step would
enable the supervision of legitimate opium and hashish consumption, which
would occur according to specific limits about age, medical status and spatial
location. Although the proposal has not yet been approved, it has been dis-
cussed in the highly influential Expediency Council (ADNA, September 12,
2015). It has been taken into account and promoted beyond governmental
venues. During the International Conference on Addiction Science that took
place in Tehran in September 2015, leading scholars in drugs policy and
public officials organised a stand-alone panel that focused on regulation and
legalisation of cannabis, putting forth models to be implemented in Iran.
Analysis: religious interpretation of cannabis
Legislative reforms and policy developments are influenced by multiple
institutional and knowledge agents. Drugs policy, too, operates through
various lines of enquiries. Religion, understood as a body of traditions, ethics
and dispositions, is one important aspect. This of course is relevant in the
context of the Islamic Republic, where religion stands at the foundation of the
political order.3 There are several reasons why the role of religion is key to
the study of public policy in Iran. Firstly, the Islamic Republic is a political
machine that combines secular institutions of government – such as anti-
narcotics agencies –with religious forms of political formulation. The latter is
best exemplified in the fact that Islam and Islamic law, as developed through
the Shia Ja’fari School, are the base of the Constitution as written in 1980
(Schirazi, 1998). This means that laws and policies adopted by the state have
to go through a process of evaluation that ensures their religious validity.
When parliament approves a law, the text goes through an evaluation from
an ad hoc body named the Guardian Council, which acts as a Constitutional
Court. The Guardian Council assesses the laws based on the accordance with
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). If the law is considered against Islamic law, it is
rejected and sent back to parliament.4
Secondly, Shia Muslim refer to a marja‘, a “source of emulation” who is
knowledgeable about religious affairs, to regulate the everyday religious
practice. This person is a learned scholar, specialised in religious exegesis,
with an undisputed authority among its peers. There are generally many
marja‘s at the same time, so Muslims are free to choose whom to follow. The
interpretation of themarja“ is the ‘final word” on an issue (Walbridge, 2001).
In modern Iranian history, there are examples attesting to the social power of
these religious figures. In 1890, the Iranian government under the Naser al-
Din Shah signed a concession that granted a Tobacco monopoly to the British
Empire. Mass protests erupted in the cities and a leading Shia authority, in-
deed a marja“, emanated a fatwa (a religious opinion) calling for the boycott
of all tobacco products (Keddie, 1966). The boycott was so successful that it is
said that of one the Shah”s wives told the shah ‘that she and those around her
would avoid the use of tobacco because the marja“ had declared its use re-
ligiously forbidden”. As Walbridge suggest, the shah’s wife listened to the
marja‘ rather than the husband (Walbridge, 2001).
Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the role of the
marja“ has gone through a double process. On the one hand, it has gained
prominence, increased its financial tutelage, and found itself closer to the
political machine (whereas historically religious authorities had been quietist
vis à vis power). On the other hand, they have seen their leverage eroded by
the authority of Iran”s head of state, himself a religious scholar (faqih). This
coexistence allows Iranian citizens (of Shia faith) to seek the opinion of their
marja‘ on matters of their concern, while being still expected to respect the
laws of the state.
Religious interpretation has been the engine for radical change in the last
three decades. For instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic
Republic, declared the legality and acceptability of sex change surgery. His
religious response enabled people seeking gender reassignment, to find the
support of the Iranian state in the process. All costs and assistances are today
covered by state institutions and transgender people are fully recognised in
their rights (Najmabadi, 2013). Another example is provided by the current
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who has published his official opinion with
regard to advanced fertility treatment. He believes that treatments such as in-
vitro fertilization, including practices using donor eggs and donor sperm, are
allowed and in line with Islamic jurisprudence, a position that puts him far
ahead of many regulations worldwide (Clarke, 2007).
In the field of drugs policy, the marja“s have expressed condemnation of
drug trafficking and called for state support to solve ‘the question of drug
addiction” (DCHQ, undated). In the 2000s, harm reduction measures were
approved and adopted nationwide, with the ideological support of leading
clerics. The religious authorities approved of practices such as needle-ex-
change and distribution, methadone maintenance and other generally con-
troversial measures. Recently the Iranian government has approved the
3 It applies to other contexts too: the influence of Pentecostalism in Latin American
drugs policy; Evangelical churches’ ideas about substance disorder in the United States;
Orthodox Christianity and its leverage over Russian policymaking. See Zigon, J. (2011).
"A moral and ethical assemblage in Russian Orthodox drug rehabilitation." Ethos 39(1):
30–50, Seward Delaporte, P. (2017). "‘We Will Revive’: addiction, spiritual warfare, and
recovery in Latin America’s cocaine production zone." Third World Quarterly: 1–16.
4 There are ways to get around apparent incongruences when the necessity of public
law outplays religious dogmas In special cases − and drugs policy is one of these – the
laws are not discussed neither by the Parliament nor by the Guardian Council. They are
discussed, formulated and legislated in the Expediency Council. This body has the power
to legislate in situations when Parliament and Guardian Council do not find a way out of
the legislative impasse. It is also charged with the duty to formulate laws on issues of
highest interest to the political order. Since 1988, the date of the first drugs laws in Iran,
the Expediency Council has been the sole institution charged with the task of pro-
mulgating drug laws Ghiabi, 2018.
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opening of two safe injection rooms in Tehran (Ghiabi, 2017). No clerical
opposition was manifested towards this project.
The responses that the marja‘s provided to the questions (Table 1)
are reported in the Appendix A.
Based on the Appendix A, one can come up with a number of
analytical considerations
First, for the majority of the religious scholars questioned, cannabis is not
haram, that is to say that it is not totally forbidden. This is no minor result if
one takes into account the uncompromising ban on drug use currently in
place in Iran. The fact that, from an Islamic law perspective, the substance has
an ambiguous status means that discussions around its potential regulated
administration can gain legitimacy in the public debate. Regulation of ad-
ministration is what the large majority of the marja‘s suggest with regard to
this substance.
Secondly, and crucially, the majority of the scholars is of the opinion that
if cannabis is used for medical purposes, which must be demonstrated and
justified through scientific and medical research, there is no ban on its use, as
long as it is justified for reasons other than intoxication and inebriation. Some
of the scholars argue that, given the health risk that the substance might
cause, its administration must occur with a strong supervision of the state and
with caution. In a nutshell, one can infer the structure of a state regulated
model for medical cannabis. The marja‘s do not specify what does state su-
pervision signify, as organisational aspects are the turf of political adminis-
trators and not of the clerical jurisprudence. One could speculate that by state
supervision it is intended a strict control on production and sale of cannabis,
according to specific rules regulating consumption and administration.
Thirdly, cultivation of cannabis for pharmaceutical production is re-
garded as legitimate for the majority of the scholars. Should the Iranian
government take steps towards the cultivation of medical cannabis, as it is
done in many countries, religious authorities would not pose objections as
long as this is done with careful supervision. Some, nonetheless, would object
on the ground that the substance is prohibited in itself. In principle, pro-
duction and cultivation is not allowed if the objective is to transform the
substance into something regarded as forbidden. That implies that, in hy-
pothesis, cannabis could not be exported to countries where it is illegal. The
legal argument adopted by the marja‘s insists on the respect of the laws in
place in the country.5
Fourthly, one wonders, for instance, whether cannabis with a very
low THC levels (and high CBD) would qualify as a non-intoxicant
substance according to what reported in the Appendix A. If that is the
case, then its consumption could be regulated with no religious concern
because the substance does not intoxicate the consumer.
Finally, none of the scholars considers cannabis a fully legal and
permitted substance according to Islamic law. Its legality, six out of
eight argue, is subject to conditions, circumstances and limits (Table 2).
The second part of the questions (5–8) referred to how cannabis use
affects religious practice for Muslims. The question on impurity (najes) is
significant because it bears upon cannabis users and their relation to the rest
of society. Impure substances and people who get in contact with them are to
be avoided. It is said that everything is pure for Muslims, unless proven otherwise.
All the scholars agree that cannabis and its derivatives are pure (that is to say,
are not najes), because they do not belong to the list of impure substance that
has been redacted over the last ten centuries.
As for medical use of cannabis during the month of Ramadan, most of the
scholars suggest that it is forbidden and it breaks the fasting and should
therefore be avoided. However, one of them, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, one of the
most influential marja‘s worldwide, declares that it is allowed for the sick to
use medical cannabis if not using it represents a harm on the person’s health.
For most of the scholars, praying is valid while using cannabis, as long as the
person praying understands what he/she is saying.
While overall the marja‘s maintain a conservative standing on the ques-
tion of drug use, when asked to respond on the religious validity of cannabis
use, for instance, for medical reasons, they demonstrate a level of pragma-
tism, that arguably could bestow some legitimacy on proposal of cannabis
law reform.
Conclusions
Cannabis has been long debated in the Islamic world. Despite most
Muslim majority countries today enforce a strict prohibition on its use, there
are countries such as the Islamic Republic where reform of cannabis laws are
under consideration. The drug policy community has ignored this develop-
ment and, in this regard, has reinforced Orientalist misconceptions about the
inability of non-western countries to achieve meaningful change (Robins,
2013). Proof of this Orientalist gaze towards the situation of drugs in the
Middle East is given by the absence of meaningul studies of the region’s drugs
policy or, for that matter, drugs history. More often, prohibition of narcotic or
stimulant substances is justified as an axiom of Islamic prohibitions on in-
toxication (Kamarulzaman & Saifuddeen, 2010; Robins, 2013). Yet, as this
article shows, Islamic jurisprudence and, especially, shi‘ate jurisprudence has
adopted a flexible and open-ended approach, for instance, with regards to
cannabis. More interestingly, the case of Iranian drug law reform suggests
that the process has engendered from a domestic debate around drug policy
and not from the global reformist movement active in North America. Of
course, ideas and models are evaluated by indigenous stakeholders on the
global platform, but much of the witty-gritty transformations take form in
continuity with historical debates around drugs policy.
As the first part of this article described, debates about cannabis
within the Middle East and Iran have been vibrant for several centuries
now. The experience of medical cannabis as well as the traditions of
counterintuitive religious interpretation with regard to social and
medical questions (e.g. status of transgenderism) set the background of
today’s debate. In the second part of the article, instead, we tackled how
the political order of the Islamic Republic, which has generally been
described as conservative and isolated from international debates (also
through sanctions), has been capable of promoting stimulating debates
around cannabis regulation. The article focused on a peculiarity of the
Iranian system: the coexistence of political and religious institutions. In
the field of drugs policy, the article reported how religious scholars are
not inherently against the regulation of cannabis. The majority of them
accept forms of regulation and argue that cannabis is not totally for-
bidden in Islamic law.
Beside the value of this statement per se, the interpretations of the
marja‘s is significant in light of the ongoing debate about cannabis le-
galisation in Iran.6 Already in 2016, a reform of the national drug laws
Table 2
Marja's and Cannabis Interpretation.
Cannabis is not allowed Cannabis is allowed for medical
reasons and under state supervision)
Cannabis is
allowed
Hossein Mazaheri
Esfehani
Naser Makarem Shirazi
Mohammad-Reza
Modaressi Yazdi
Asadollah Bayat Zanjani
Musà Shobeyri Zanjani
Abul-Karim Musavi Ardebili
Mohammad ‘Alavi Gorgani
Ali Sistani
5 It is problematic to compare the response of the marja‘s with that of scholars in other
jurisdiction, since the role of the marja‘s is of exegesis rather than systematic jur-
isprudence – at least in the circumstances of this study. To do so, one would require a
comparative approach, which in fact could be the object of a future study.
6 The debate about cannabis legalisation is paralleled and in fact contextual to the
debate about legalisation of opium. Iran already disposes of a controlled programme of
opium tincture, but public officials have voiced support for the introduction of a medical
opium programme, similar to the one adopted during the 1970s under the Pahlavi
monarchy. For today’s debate, see ADNA 12 September 2017. For an overview of the
1970s programme, see Ghiabi, 2018a.
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indicated that, in the coming three years, the Iranian government
should take control of the drug market with the objective to cut off the
connection between drug trafficking networks and consumers (ADNA
12 September 2017). If taken seriously, this proposal would establish
legal cannabis cultivation and distribution under some form of state
supervision, which would need to be discussed at parliamentary and
ministerial levels. It will not lead to a legal market of cannabis and
neither the creation of Dutch style coffee shop system. In light of the
religious input on this debate, which however we should not over-
emphasize, the potential model could be in the guise of a regulated
distribution, possibly medicalised, and initially only for domestic use.
To the surprise of international observers and drugs policy scholars,
Iran might be the next country to regulate cannabis.
Conflict of interests
None.
Acknowledgements
Maziyar Ghiabi’s research was supported by the Wellcome Trust
Society & Ethics Scholarship [grant number WT101988MA]. The au-
thors would like to thank the comments and advise of Hamideh Gooshi-
Dehaqi.
Appendix A. Responses from the Marja's.
Ayatollah (Marja‘-e Taqlid) Responses to Questions
Naser Makarem Shirazi (he responded discursively):
‘Firstly, eating cannabis, for as much as we know, in small quantities does not produce intoxication, but if cannabis
or its derivatives produced intoxication (even small intoxication), its use is haram.
Secondly, its cultivation for consumption is not allowed and must be countered. But in quantities necessary for
pharmaceutical reasons under strong supervision, it is not prohibited. Its export too for this purposes is forbidden.
Third, as Khomeini said, hashish is not impure.’
Asadollah Bayat Zanjani 1. If it doesn’t have significant effects or side-effects, there is no problem
2. On the question’s hypothesis, there is no problem.
3. If it is programmed and can be controlled and is not abused there is no prohibition.
4. If it is for valid and reasonable objectives, it is not a problem.
5. It’s not impure unless dissolved in a drink.
6. If it is eaten or drank, it has the same regulation as the other edible things.
7. If during the prayer you are intoxicated (khomar) and do not understand what are you saying, then the prayer is
not valid.
8. If it is exclusively for advertising cannabis use, then it is not allowed.
Musà Shobeyri Zanjani 1, 2, 4. If it has a fundamental harm for the body or if it causes corruption to society, it is not allowed. Otherwise, if
there is a law on tis issue,…, it must be respected. Its export too if it is intended for illegal consumption is not
allowed.
3. Based on the question’s hypothesis, it is not forbidden.
5. It’s pure.
6. If it is a booster/regenerator, then it is not allowed. If it is a powerful pleasure inducing one, based on caution, it is
not allowed.
7. It’s valid.
8. It depends whether what they advertise is legal or illegal use.
Abul-Karim Musavi
Ardebili
1. It varies depending on type of the drug, way of consumption and use. If it is useful for the human, and it is not
narcotic, there is no issue.
2. If it is not illegal use then it is not an issue.
3. Cultivation of cannabis for legal use poses no issue, but if there is potential illegal use and application, it is
necessary to be with the supervision of the state.
4. In general, the cultivation, production, sale of cannabis and its similar, which have a legal and illegal use, has no
issue for the purpose of legal use. However, if there is a chance of abuse, its use must take place with the
supervision of the state and if there is a law in relation to this, it must be respected.
5. Hashish is not impure.
6. No.
7. It does not harm its prayer.
8. No.
Mohammad ‘Alavi Gorgani 1. Cannabis consumption is accepted but its derivatives, if harmful or confusing the mind, are haram.
2. Has no issue, as long as necessary.
3. Has no issue.
4. Has no issue.
5. It’s not impure.
6. If it’s smoked, it breaks the fasting of Ramadan.
7. It’s valid.
8. It’s against the law and in many cases it’s haram.
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Hossein Mazaheri Esfehani 1, 2, 3, 4. The use of hashish and its production is not permitted.
5. Cannabis is not impure.
6. If a Muslim uses hashish during Ramadan, that breaks fasting.
7. If the Muslim is conscious while on cannabis the prayer is valid. But if he is intoxicated the prayer is invalid.
8. It’s not valid.
Mohammad-Reza
Modaressi Yazdi
1. Cannabis itself is allowed. Its derivatives are not. If you obtain a composition of hashish, then it is not allowed, as
in the case of grapes and wine.
2. It is haram and sinful.
3. Its cultivation for the production of hashish is not allowed under any condition.
4. It’s not allowed.
5. It is not impure.
6. It is with no doubt haram and it’s necessary to give up for Ramadan.
7. It is a big sin like drinking wine or incest, but his prayer is valid if he/she is not intoxicated.
8. Advertising prohibited products is not allowed and is sinful.
Ali Sistani 1. Cannabis use in itself in not haram. Its derivatives are different, if they are intoxicant/inebriant (musakkar) or are
harmful for sure, then they are haram.
2. If it’s among the forbidden one then it’s not permitted, unless in the time of necessity and urgency and in the
measure necessary to solve the urgency.
3. Yes, it is allowed.
4. Yes, it’s allowed.
5. It’s not impure.
6. For the sick for whom not using it is harmful, then it is not forbidden to use it.
7. It is valid but if its derivate is haram, he/she should repent.
8. Advertising its legal use is not forbidden.
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